

Review Essay

Islamic Social and Political Movements in Turkey

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In recent decades, political Islam has increasingly become a focus of political science. Numerous branches of scholarship that analyze its dynamics within seemingly divergent theoretical frameworks have emerged. Some scholars have concentrated on international security threats stemming from political Islam (what can be called the outcomes of this phenomenon), whereas others have focused on the causes of religious resurgence in an attempt to identify what has led to political Islam's revival. This review essay will evaluate the second branch of scholarship, which, I believe, explores the core of the overarching issue and helps identify the causes, the "how" and "why" of the matter, rather than providing a descriptive analysis of "what" is happening.

How and why Islamic social/political movements (ISPMs) have emerged, as well as what sociopolitical circumstances determine where they are headed, is essential to studying political Islam effectively. To this end, I will narrowly focus on the literature of ISPMs in Turkey,¹ whose "secular" identity makes it an intriguing and unique case in comparison to other predominantly Muslim countries, presumably with the exception of Tunisia. Thus, the emergence of strong Islamic movements in Turkey, how the interplay between the state and these groups have unfolded, and the future prospects have broader implications for social movements, civil society, and democratization in numerous countries. Moreover, the academic work on Islamic movements is highly dynamic, since current social and political events continuously shape these movements, which affect the country's sociopolitical context.

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The main purpose of this literature review is to identify and discuss its thematic core as it relates to ISPMs. Scholars converge on a thematic core that emphasizes the role of ISPMs as informal structures in identity formation and the assertion of these identities in social and political forums. I will also address the strengths and weaknesses of the literature, analyze the aptness of the methodologies employed, and suggest improvement in those areas that need further study.

What Is an ISPM?

Several comprehensive definitions have been drawn from the literature for social movements in general.² However, Hakan Yavuz's definition that "Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational and economic spheres"³ is the most functional, as it is specifically tailored for ISPMs. Implicit in this definition is the political aspect of those Islamic movements that might seek to reconstruct the state's official and unofficial "institutional structures." A few examples of the most influential and studied movements in Turkey would be the Naksibendi Sufi order, which has long historical roots in Turkey, and the Nurcu movement, which has a more intellectual edge and emphasizes the use of all possible modern means for Muslims to achieve their full potential in education and business.

Studies of Islamic movements, therefore, have concentrated on these movements' social and political aspects in an attempt to distinguish groups having political agendas from groups having only a spiritual nature. Scholars agree that these two types of Islamic movements have to be placed in separate categories. However, such scholars as Ayse Saktanber and Heinz Kramer fail to make this crucial separation and therefore lump all Islamic movements under one umbrella. This approach misrepresents reality and thus engenders false conclusions. Richard Tapper's *Islam in Modern Turkey* emphasizes Islam's dual function in Turkey as "the private one of giving intellectual and emotional meaning to life, an ethics, an eschatology and the promise of salvation; and the public function of providing a political ideology, a cultural and communal identity and social solidarity."⁴

Most scholars focus on Islam's role in the political process, asking if Islamic revivalism constitutes a political threat to the Republic and may lead to an Islamic revolution. They are voicing the Turkish elites' concerns, which are similar to the West's centuries-old fear of Islam. On the other hand, recent works reflect the emerging realization that social dynamics constitute the

underlying cause of political objectives. Therefore, the literature is becoming more and more balanced by means of analyzing both private and public roles, which is an idiosyncratic feature of Islam and ISPMs.

Methodological Issues

I will first present Crawford Young's typology, which effectively maps out the topic's methodological implications, and then discuss the literature's thematic core and analyze its conceptual ambiguities. These approaches provide different explanations of the "causal power of historical versus proximate influences"⁵ and identify causal factors and the generalizability of arguments over time and across space. However, tracing the shifts in the methodologies used in ISPM literature enables one to observe the concomitant developments in the overall approach to the ISPM phenomenon. I will also highlight the consequences of each approach's methodological problems. The approximate time frames of these methodologies' predominance in the literature show that each methodology was influenced by the dominant approach or methodology used in social sciences at that time. For instance, when modernization theory emerged as a leading approach in political science, ISPM literature was also affected by it.⁶

Essentialism and Textual Modernization Theory

Essentialism, which "seeks to reduce the diverse spectrum of human relations to a few 'essential' causes and to identify certain defining traits and texts as keys to understanding a particular religious or cultural community,"⁷ dominated ISPM studies in Turkey mostly during the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization theory and development literature dominated this scholarship, as textualism was the common approach in all explanations. Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* and Niyazi Berkes' *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* are prime examples of the essential textual approach. Such scholars view traditionalism as the critical hindrance in the way of modernization and confine Islam to certain core principles based on ancient texts that are either not subject to change or interpretation or cannot be adapted to modernity.

A main criticism of this approach is that essentialists exaggerate the role of Islamic doctrine in the private and public spheres.⁸ All Islamic movements are lumped together, and their diverse principles, goals, and natures are therefore ignored. A second criticism is that this approach's proposed reductionist dichotomies are too simplistic and do not adequately reflect the complex realities. For instance, the "modernity vs. traditionalism" dichotomy

fails to account for the technological innovations and economic developments that ultimately influence social dynamics. Many countries that are not categorized as “modern” are nevertheless undergoing some process of modernization and adaptation. Also, the dichotomy of “religious vs. secular” introduced sharp cleavages within Turkish society that were not present before the emergence of such divisive concepts in the literature.

The final and major criticism of this approach is the misleading or simply wrong conclusions reached by its proponents. Berkes, Lewis, Daniel Lerner, and other essentialists argued that the Kemalist ideology, particularly secularism, would be Turkey’s manifest destiny in its quest for modernity. Recent developments of religious revivalism illustrate that they ignored the possible repercussions of state repression, forced reforms, and the significance of Muslim identity for the Turkish nation.

Contextualism, Deprivation Theory, and State-Centered Approaches

Contextualism, which emerged as a reaction to essentialist scholarship, emphasizes the “contingencies in the study of Islamic social movements and rules out the irreversibility and teleology of modernization theory and the concomitant essentialization of Islam.”⁹ Serif Mardin defines this scholarship, mainly of the 1960s and 1970s, as a Marxist perspective that shifted the focus to conflict, rather than to consensus and economic structures.¹⁰ Mehmet Ozay, in his *Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery*, argues that Muslim intellectuals, and therefore ISPMs in a gradual manner, appeared as a reaction to widespread corruption in the state’s structure that deprived and marginalized the religious masses. He asserts that the main challenge facing the Muslim world is underdevelopment. Therefore, in his relative deprivation theory, he claims that Muslim entrepreneurs utilize Islamic symbols and metaphors to increase their share of the country’s wealth.¹¹

Likewise, Kramer emphasizes the growth of Islamic business establishments and writes that their moderate attitudes are “an important contribution to the preservation of overall political stability in Turkey.”¹² But this theory is too narrowly focused on the material gains of a limited segment of the religious masses (businessmen) and fails to explain the overall social and historical reasons behind ISPMs. Another theory forwarded under contextualism is the organizational or leadership approach, which posits that ISPMs are dynamic and diverse organizations driven by leaders dedicated to infil-

trating the state. However, it falls short of accounting for the causes of Islamic movements and how Islam is mobilized within society.

Another contextualist approach focuses on the state-building process. Its proponents believe that the particular state formation shaped by the colonial powers after the Ottoman Empire's defeat during the First World War is responsible for the lack of democracy and civil society as well as the rise of ISPMs, which they define as "fragmented reactions to the oppressive state."¹³ Yet this state-centered explanation overlooks the sociopolitical changes that have occurred since the state-building process began, as well as the ISPMs' reciprocal role in shaping and possibly strengthening democracy and civil society.

Constructivism and the Hermeneutic Approach

Most scholarship during the 1980s and 1990s shifted the focus of ISPM studies to the identity formation aspect of Islamic movements. Constructivism assumes that societies are the product of human construction. Thus, in order to understand Islamic political identity, a hermeneutical approach that focuses on human agency and its constant interaction with the social structure is used. Yavuz, who employs a constructivist approach in his *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, argues that it is the individual who constructs social realities and so defines ISPMs as "identity movements." Likewise, Andrew Davison's hermeneutic analysis, as presented in his *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, supports the assertion that ISPMs actually strengthen civil society and contribute to establishing a pluralist democracy in Turkey through forming their separate identities, rather than accepting what the state imposes on them.

Mardin's *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey* has been in the vanguard of this genre of scholarship. In this book, he gives a detailed analysis of the Nurcu movement, one of Turkey's most prominent Islamic movements. This book may be considered one of the most serious scholarly works to focus on the individual as an agent of social change. The level of analysis was "the subject's understanding of his own cultural system as providing a means for his as well as our understanding of the way society functions" and "psychological processes which operate with even less of a conscious choice than is the case in rule-governed behaviour."¹⁴ Modernization theorists make this same argument.

Similarly, Nilufer Gole in her *The Forbidden Modern* employs a sociological approach to the complex phenomenon of the rise of Islamic funda-

mentalism via modernity, religion, and gender relations. She also provides an identity-formation explanation. Saktanber, author of *Living Islam*, uses a sociological approach in her attempt to explain the role of the women in ISPMs. According to her, “secularization cannot be separated from the ideological construction of modern state formation processes.”¹⁵ Thus, she focuses on the individual as the agent constructing the contemporary formation of an Islamic identity.

The constructivist theoretical approach is centered around the concept of “opportunity spaces,” which are used to explain how human agents form an Islamic political identity. Even though this broad term encompasses all opportunities that have been opened up by technology, the extension of democratic rights (i.e., freedom of speech and freedom of association), or modernity in general, it is mostly used to refer to the Islamic movements’ use of the media (e.g., newspapers, television, radio, or print media) to reestablish an Islamic identity. Furthermore, Yavuz emphasizes that “these opportunity spaces have come to signify differentiation – multiple articulations of the Muslim ‘self’ and interests – and generally have promoted pluralism and the fragmentation of any efforts at imposing a hegemonic Islamic ideology.”¹⁶

The Role of Kemalism in ISPM Formation

The majority of the scholarly work on ISPMs in Turkey base their arguments on a discussion of the role of Kemalist ideology, particularly secularism, along with the other causes of ISPMs, what their nature is, and how influential these movements have been in society.¹⁷ Scholars mostly agree that Kemalism, particularly the Kemalist version of secularism,¹⁸ have shaped religious life and the ISPMs. However, they provide different perspectives as to how exactly the interaction unfolded. Tapper argues that Ataturk “was not content with separating Islam from politics,” but that he also wanted to replace religion with a modern secular ideology: “His reforms even further restricted Islam to the private, personal sphere: individuals should worship alone,”¹⁹ which drove religious movements underground during the 1920s and 1930s. Religion was seen as the backwardness that was to blame for Turkey’s underdevelopment.

The dichotomy that emerged is still extremely strong in society: the republican who is modern, secular, and western as opposed to the Islamic or religious person who is backward, decadent, and Ottoman.²⁰ This cultural cleavage resulted from Ataturk’s secular social engineering project and is seen as the basis for the “irresolvable paradox” that is causing the continuous domestic tension that is weakening Turkey.²¹ The religious segments of

society became more and more marginalized as a result of Kemalism, and ISPMs were seen as an outlet for them to assert themselves.

Furthermore, Mardin claims that these Kemalist reforms were intended to change society's values (not only institutions and structures) but were not successful, for Kemalism paradoxically strengthened Islamic identity. This was exactly contrary to what it was originally intended to do. According to Tapper, the Kemalists could not replace Islam's multi-level appeal, which encompassed the citizens' personal and social life.²² As evidence, Tapper argues that

... the strength of the Islamist movements of the 1980s ran counter to the expectations of many republican academics and intellectuals, for whom the revival of religious activity since the 1950s had merely confirmed prejudices about the continuing cultural backwardness of the peasants, which would in due course be remedied by education and modernization.²³

Conceptual Issues

A key issue within ISPM literature is the conceptual ambiguities or fuzzy concepts that demand clarification so that researchers can acquire a better understanding of the phenomenon. Many frequently used key concepts, such as "fundamentalist/extremist/militant," "secularism/laicism," "modernity," and newer ones like "opportunity spaces" take on different, or in some cases even opposing, meanings in different works. Some authors equate fundamentalism with extremism or militancy (e.g., Kramer, Lewis, and Saktanber), whereas Yavuz and Mardin use it to symbolize a call to return to the Prophet's fundamental (essential, original) teachings as realized during Islam's "golden age" in Madinah.²⁴ Likewise, modernity is a contested concept that, for Lerner and Lewis, means a process of rigorous westernization.

On the other hand, most recent definitions differ drastically from the original conception put forward by modernization theory. Yavuz gives a comprehensive, post-modern definition of modernity as

... a global condition in which individuals and groups are able to redefine social relations on the basis of social imagination. This imagination presupposes a rich repository of tradition, without which traditional societies would lose their inner cohesiveness and viability, the very precursor for modern development."²⁵

Ozay attacks the puzzle of why Islamic scholarship stopped in the medieval period and continues to be stagnant, even though "Islam is quite compatible with modernity."²⁶ Furthermore, Bozdogan and Kasaba's *Rethinking*

Modernity and National Identity in Turkey is a collection of articles that avoids reductionist definitions of modernity and embarks upon a critical evaluation of Turkish modernization. Consequently, these concepts are key to ISPM literature, and all of these competing meanings are at the core of the debate. Thus, analyzing them provides us with the bigger picture.

Thematic Core

The scholarship on ISPMs in Turkey is rich in perspectives, methodological approaches, and conclusions. Nevertheless, I believe that this diversity contains a theoretical convergence that cuts across rival explanations. I have identified the thematic core of the literature common in almost all of the relevant scholarly work as identity formation.

Yavuz claims that “contemporary Islamic movements in Turkey seek to reclaim the Muslim self, which is perceived as having been robbed of its authenticity and heritage.”²⁷ He defines identity as “a ‘frame of reference’ within which the social and political situations are recognized.”²⁸ Islamic movements are the instruments through which these frames of references are constructed and articulated. Scholars agree that ISPMs serve multiple levels of this identity formation. First, movements construct an identity that has not necessarily been rationally chosen by every human agent who is a follower. However, this identity does become the identity of the movement with which individuals associate themselves. In this sense, an ISPM serves as an identity formation structure and has a “constitutive and framing role of popular Islamic culture.”²⁹ One aspect of this phenomenon is that such identities are predominantly contextualized through gender, class, tribal, and ethnic bonds. Therefore, an ISPM provides new or modern associational Islamic identities for these individuals.³⁰

Second, they serve the key function of fulfilling the “belongingness” need of human beings. Individuals have an innate need to belong to or identify themselves with a structure or a group, some form of formal or informal organization that can fulfill this need. ISPMs provide such a structure of association for individuals who have been marginalized in Turkey. Third, an ISPM’s most outward function is its role as a channel to assert these identities. Muslims can participate in social and political life (from which they are otherwise deprived) and assert their identities through these movements. For instance, Islamic groups disseminate information about their identity (ideas, actions, and social constructs) through the modern mass media. Movements are instrumental in enabling individuals to assert their identities by establishing television channels, magazines, newspapers, and traditional print media.

Therefore, any study of ISPMs occurs at the individual level and then is gradually built up to the aggregate level. Scholars of ISPMs tackle such questions as how Islam has been practiced since the republic's establishment and the shifts in its meaning and importance for individuals in order to draw conclusions about ISPMs.³¹

Scholars emphasize that this thematic core, an ISPM's identity formation function, is "contingent upon and relational to," and therefore has to be studied in relation to, the social and political context within which it is constituted. For instance, the processes of modernity, particularly the mass media having become widespread and easily accessible by the broader masses, has given ISPMs the opportunity spaces needed to reconfigure and then disseminate new group identities. Likewise, such political developments as state attitudes and policies toward the freedom of religious belief and expression play an important role in the identity formation process. At times, state policies actually facilitate ISPM activities; however, most of the time they hinder an ISPM's emergence and spread and thus give a "reactionary" tone to the identity formation process.

Characterizations of ISPMs as either multi-dimensional or unified entities have implications for the identity formation thematic core. Some scholars, among them Gole, Yavuz, and Mardin, argue that Islamic movements have divergent characteristics, objectives, and natures that correspond with Islam's historical multi-dimensional aspect. Others, such as Saktanber and Kramer, believe that all of these different forms might be viewed as, in fact, having a single unifying ideology or value system.³² Therefore, they attribute the same characteristics, objectives, and worldviews to all of the individuals who make up these movements and, combining them together, consider them as a unit having the same identity. Clearly, human agents have different goals and characteristics that are reflected by the organizations and structures of which they are a part. This is the reason why numerous religious movements have appeared to accommodate these differences. Therefore, lumping all ISPMs under one umbrella or claiming that they all reflect the same "Islamic identity" does not accurately represent the complex reality.

Prescriptive Analysis

Overall, the literature on ISPMs in Turkey exhibits several weaknesses. First, only a limited number of scholars are working on political Islam and/or ISPMs, and their names reappear constantly in articles and books. In addition, many of these works lack scholarly objectivity because the

researchers fail to address fairly and adequately all aspects of the subject. The main reason for this subjectivity is that the arguments seem to be one-sided, if not merely black-and-white, because they do not address alternative explanations or the subject's various complexities.

Many of the books are collections of articles by different contributors on several topics. As a result, there is no overall consensus on a narrowly stated conclusion. I believe this is the literature's major weakness, for thorough and broad research books are rather rare. Only Yavuz's *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* is a comprehensive study of this broad phenomenon. A few more scholars, such as Gole and Mardin, have produced highly academic work that is impartial. However, almost no quantitative research has been conducted in this area, and the resulting lack of empirical data and statistical analysis makes it harder for researchers to obtain rigorous evidence to back up their arguments and claims. Most of the scholars are either anthropologists and sociologists (and a few political scientists) who conduct field research in the form of in-depth interviews and descriptive analysis. In other words, there is a need for public opinion surveys, statistical analyses that provide further explanatory leverage to current arguments, and prospective research.

One of the literature's major strengths is the existence of clearly definable thematic cores and methodologies. However, scholars also study different aspects of the same phenomenon and have various perspectives on the dynamics of ISPMs, which further broadens the horizons of possible knowledge. Recently, promising developments have arisen due to the increase in the quantity of more objective scholars who are analyzing the phenomenon with all of its complexities, rather than just giving a black-and-white account. This increase in critical analysis suggests that contemporary scholars are dissatisfied with past works and feel the need to engage in more serious research. Clarifying fuzzy concepts, as well as conducting broader and more thorough research, would benefit the literature immensely.

Endnotes

1. The books and articles reviewed here are Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). The latest edition came out in 1998 (Routledge). In this review, I refer to the original 1964 edition, which left its impact in the literature for three decades; Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Nilufer Gole, *The Forbidden Modern* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Daniel P. Lerner,

The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1964); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Julie Marcus, *A World of Difference: Islam and Gender Hierarchy in Turkey* (New Jersey: Zed, 1992); Serif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey," in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research* 52, col. 4 (1985); Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Mehmet Ozay, *Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery* (London: Routledge, 1990); Elisabeth Ozdalga, *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey* (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1998), Ayse Saktanber, *Living Islam: Women, Religion and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Sami Selcuk, *Longing for Democracy* (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye, 2000); Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Crawford Young, *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

2. Sidney Tarrow effectively defines social movements as "a collective challenge by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities." See Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3-4. Also, the new social movement theory forwarded by Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine adds the role of beliefs, symbols, and values in reconstructing conventional norms and practices, See Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (1985): 793; and Alain Touraine, *Beyond Neoliberalism* (Maldern, MA: Blackwell, 2001).
3. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford, NY: Oxford Press, 2003), 23.
4. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 6. The multitude of articles in this book collectively seek to study the construction of Islamic identity through "Islamic institutions," schools, Sufi orders, intellectual activities, and Islamic literature. The overall question addressed is whether or not Turkey is still a unique case in the Muslim world and how much longer its "secular state" designation will be appropriate.
5. Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, nos. 6-7 (Aug.-Sept. 2000): 703-34, 705.
6. The same is true for dependency theory, when political economy approaches were influential.
7. Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito, eds. *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 16.

8. Ibid., 17.
9. Ibid., 18.
10. Mardin, in Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).
11. Ozay, *Islamic Identity and Development*, 76.
12. Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 68.
13. Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 19.
14. Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 16.
15. Saktanber, *Living Islam*, 9.
16. Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 7.
17. Feroz Ahmad's work, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, is a detailed historical account of state formation, starting with the Ottoman legacies that have influenced modern Turkey and moving on to the Kemalist reforms, structural changes within the state, an analysis of the military coups, and the emergence of Islamic movements within these developments. See Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge Press, 1993).
18. The discourse on Turkish secularism is essential to understanding the dynamics of the country's social and political context that led the formation of ISPMs. It is crucial to distinguish between secularism and laicism and to answer the following questions: "Does it mean separation of religion from the political arena, or should it rather mean control of religious affairs by the state? How free from state interference should an individual's religious beliefs and practices be?" Kramer, in his *A Changing Turkey*, argues that "from the beginning, state and Islam in modern Turkey have never been separated, although state policies were to be designed and conducted without any relation to religious factors and the official ideology aimed at making religion a totally private affair" (p. 57).
19. Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 6.
20. Ibid., 7.
21. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (fall 2000): 21-42, p. 22.
22. Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 7.
23. Ibid., 3.
24. History books consider this period to be the apex of social justice, equality, and freedoms extended to minorities (Christians and Jews), a time when the Islamic and natural sciences were flourishing. This call signifies the Muslim world's awakening from its centuries-long economic, academic, and democratic stagnation. Therefore, these scholars in fact use this term in a positive sense, claiming that this is the actual meaning of the word and the current phenomena observed in Turkey.
25. Yavuz and Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 23.

26. Ozay, *Islamic Identity and Development*, 4.
27. Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 7.
28. *Ibid.*, 6.
29. *Ibid.*, 20.
30. ISPM seeks “the reconstruction of everyday life by transforming everyday identity and consciousness by means of societal microinteractions that takes place” mostly through mass media. *Ibid.*, 25.
31. Mardin advocates an individualist approach focusing on the micro-analysis of where the process of identity formation takes place. See Serif Mardin, “Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Social Science,” in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, 66. White argues that Islamic movements cannot be understood “apart from the cultural beliefs, local practices, and often contradictory motivations of their adherents.” See Jenny White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 5.
32. Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 8.