Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism PDF Print E-mail

John K. Cooley, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000. 299 pages.

Reading this book is a lot like trying to eat undercooked meat – there is protein in there, but it is flavorless and tedious. You can chew and chew, but you just cannot bring yourself to swallow it. The author presents his case with an authoritative tone, stuffing each paragraph with names, dates, and historical data, but a closer look reveals the use of manipulative language that strings together half-truths and repeated insinuations with conclusions that do not directly relate to the given evidence. The “Acknowledgements” mention that the author has important friends in media and politics, yet his credentials (e.g., for whom he is working, or what his political motivations are) are not given. This is a serious weakness.

 

Even more serious is his clear contempt for Islam, for he makes no genuine distinction between Muslims’ desire for self-rule based upon their belief system (often called “Islamism”) and terrorism. The CIA’s use of Muslim lives to advance American corporate interests is taken for granted, while Muslims are portrayed as untrustworthy imbeciles or ungrateful servants. Such mainstream and moderate organizations and intellectuals as Tablighi Jamaat, Jamaat Islami, Maududi of Pakistan, and Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan are given as examples of dangerous extremism. American terrorism against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan, and its support of Israel, are unquestioned as being justified, noble, and necessary, while any attack on western interests or American lives is described with emotionally loaded terms. The only serious criticism of the United States is that it ever trusted Muslims as allies.

The introduction asserts that the West must not make Islam into a Satanic foe, which the rest of the book immediately contradicts by referring to Islam’s resurgence in Muslim countries as a contagious disease that must be quarantined and nipped in the bud before it contaminates the entire world; Islamic political parties should be outlawed before they can be voted into power by popular demand; and Islam must be limited to a cultural ritual while political control of Muslim national resources must remain in the hands of westerners.

Apparently, in the author’s analysis, a “moderate Muslim” is one who puts American and Israeli concerns above the needs of his or her own people. Chapter 1, “Carter and Brezhnev in the Valley of Decision,” discusses the Soviet–American conflicts of interest leading to covert American aid to Islamists starting in 1979, and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Chapter 2, “Anwar al-Sadat,” discusses Egypt’s precarious role as a supporter of the United States and Israel while recruiting volunteers for jihad in Afghanistan with the help of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was later imprisoned for life in a New York Federal prison. In Chapter 3, “Zia al-Haq,” the author details Pakistan’s enthusiastic cooperation with the United States and the mistrustful alliance forged between the United States and the various Islamic factions of Afghani fighters. Allegedly, the war planners gave no thought to the boom in international drug trafficking that would soon be the result of destabilizing the region. Chapter 4, “Deng Xiaoping,” goes into the CIA’s use of China’s Muslim territories to build bases for monitoring Soviet missile tests and communications, and the  Chinese arming and training of volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, who would later come back to demand independence from China.